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sions. However. the courts should alwavs be aware of a duty on their part to
examine new tests for insanity which may be offered bv the psvchological and
psychiatric professions and to accept any new rule which is the superior of the old.
In the law of insanity, it must be recognized that the psychologists and the psy-
chiatnsts are the ones who must point the way.
JAMES DANIEL CORNETTE
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DEFENSE
AS EXCUSE FOR HOMICIDE
No concept in the law seems clearer than the right of a man to kill in the
necessary defense of his own life. This basic idea seems so fundamental as to
admit no room for question. And yet an examination of the history of self defense
reveals a startling difference between its present state and its early origin.
From the very beginning of the jurisdiction of the king s courts over cnminal
cases, homicide was justifiable and consequently without penalty only where com-
mitted in execution of the law.' Such cases as killings under the king s warrant,
or in the pursuit of justice, or the killing of an outlaw, or a thief caught in the act,
or other manifest felon who resists capture- would seem always to have been
justifiable. The penalty for all other cases of homicide was plainly and simply
death or mutilation and even as late as the 19th century in England the law pro-
vided for forfeiture of goods and payment of fines to the king, although for a long
time the rule had not been enforced.i
In the case of self defense however, the king might and often did grant
pardons' notwithstanding the fact that the judges must convict the defendant of
felony as the law required.' The following is an illustrative case:
"Robert of Herthdale, arrested for having in self defense
slain Roger, Swein s son, who had slain five men in a fit of madness,
is committed to the sheriff that he may be in custody, as before, for
the lkng must be consulted about tius matter."'
Beale, Retreat From a Murderous Assault, 16 H~Av. L. REv. 568 (1903).
But see, 2 POLLOCK AND MAIrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 478 (2d ed., 1911)
where a housebreaker was killed and the slaver-was allowed to go free. Even the
authors term the defendant here as fortunate.
'POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, supra, note 1. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HAv. L. REv.
980 (1931). It would appear that tls privilege did not extend to cases where
the felon made no resistance. But see Staffordshire Collections iv. p. 215, as
quoted by POLLOCK AN MAiTLAND, supra, note 1, at 478, fn. 4, in which one who
beheaded a fleeing robber was acquitted.
3 POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, supra, note 1 at 481. For a discussion of the an-
cient scheme of wer and bloodfeud, bot and wite, and its part in the admimstra-
tion of criminal justice see POLLOCK AN) MArrLAND, supra, note 1, at 449. For
an excellent discussion of the primitive concept of indiscrimnate liability, see,
Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its-History, 7 H.Anv. L. REv. 317 (1893).
"The doer of a deed was responsible, whether he acted innocently or inadvertently,
because he was the owner, even though the weapon was wielded by a thief. "
4The king of course might grant pardons for other types of honucide and as
lus power grew the practice of giving pardons was relied on by the judges. It is
to be noted however that these pardons did not come as a matter of right but
rather 'de gracia sua et non per judicium. B.N.B., pl. 1216 as quoted in Beale,
supra, note 1 at 568, fn. 4.
'Sayre, supra, note 2 at 980; POLLOCK AND MAiTLAND, supra, note I at 479.
6 SELDEN SOCIETY, 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, No. 70 (1888).
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Another case rather clearly shows the fear in the medieval mind, acquired
perhaps from observation and experience, that the king in his wisdom might not be
pleased to grant the pardon:
"Howel the Markman, a wandering robber, and his fel-
lows assaulted a carter and would have robbed him, but the carter
slew Howel and defended himself against the others and escaped.
And whereas it is testified that Howel was a robber, let the carter go
quit thereof. And note that he is m the parts of Jerusalem, but let
him come back safely, quit of that death."7
Thus even though perhaps there was no need to resort to the king s pardon in this
particular case, the carter felt it wise to flee.8
It would appear;, however, that even in the early days there was some slight
appreciation of the manifest unjustness of having one who killed in self-defense or
through misadventure stand on the same footing with one who killed with deliber-
ate malice.' By the 18th century the use of the king s pardon was accepted as
the means of overcoming the substantive problem presented by the law which still
did not recogmze self-defense or misadventure as an excuse to the charge of homi-
cide. 0 The following is a case of the times:
"Roger of Stainton was arrested because in throwing a
stone he by misadventure killed a girl. And it is testified that this was
not by felony. And this was shown to the king, and the" king moved
by pity pardoned him the death. So let him be set free."'
Apparently the procedure followed was for the person charged with homicide
to obtain a writ from the king ordering the sheriff to take an inquest as to whether
there was a felony or whether a case of self-defense or misadventure was pre-
sented. At other times the justices themselves held the inquest without a writ
from the king. But in either case if the jurors returned a favorable verdict, a
pardon was granted by the king as a matter of course.'
This procedure was changed however in 1278 by the Statute of Gloucester.
After this Statute the defendant no longer applied to the king for a writ but m-
stead went directly before the justices. The justices then, along with the jury
determined whether in their opimon the case was one of self-defense2
Id., No. 145. As to the dire legal effect of fleeing as related to forfeiture, see
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra, note 1, at 481.
'Beale, supra, note 1 at 568, lists old cases m which one, who as here, kills a
robber in self defense and is acquitted, while a woman who kills to defend herself
from rape is not. It would appear that in the case here cited, the carter would
gain his acquittal as a matter of right, for as this note points out, from an early
date one might kill to protect himself from robbery. This would seem to be a
sort of extension of the early concept of justifiable homicide. This case also serves
to illustrate the distinction previously mentioned, between homicide in execution
of the law and homicide se defendendo.
'Sayre, supra, note 2 at 981.
10 Id. at 980.
"Supra, note 6, No. 114. Other instances of pardon for self defense and mis-
adventure, as well as mental defect may be found in the Patent Rolls of Henrj il,
as quoted by POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra, note 1, at 480. Enough may be
found in fact to indicate that such pardons were fairly common.
" POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra, note 1, at 480.
' Id. at 481. In this connection the Statute provided: "Tis may be two
ways (speaking of the defendants right to plead), either when he is indicted of
Murder or Homicide, and the Jury find it se defendendo, or when he is specially
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In case the jurors found a verdict of homicide by self-defens, it was to be
reported to the king who would, the Statute said, "take the accused into his
grace, if it pleased him." '
It is to be strictly noted, however, that the defendant in these cases of self-
defense needed the pardon of the king to be acquitted and that furthermore even
where the pardon was obtained, the necessity of forfeiting his goods and chattels
was not dispensed with.'-
At exactly what point in history these pardons of the king became a matter
of right the records do not reveal. It is clear, however, that the Chancellor more
and more signed pardons in the ling s name and that courts of equity eventually
took jurisdiction in such cases." As a consequence, pardons in cases of self-defense
became largely a matter of course in equity.
In 1509 the law had progressed to such a state that by virtue of the statute
of 24 Henry VIIP forfeiture of goods and chattels was dispensed with in certain
cases." Although in terms the statute referred only to forfeiture, the common law
courts were quick to interpret it as providing for acquital without any formal
pardon." Thus the equitable defense of self-defense, partly by statute and partly
by the liberality of the courts of law, became a legal defense.'
When the necessity ceased for a formal pardon in cases clearly not within
the statute is difficult to say. According to Stephen, statutes were passed on the
subject, as late as the 19th century.' Perhaps the Statute of 9 Geo. 4, c.81 passed
in 1828 marks the date, or perhaps through custom and usage the old law was
forgotten in an earlier day.
It seems sufficient to say however in either event, that self-defense, while
originally not an excuse for homicide, but merely a ground for pardon, became
an excuse in equity, and was at last accepted at law. From these roots has
sprung our modem law of self-defense.
JACK LOWERY, JR.
indicted, that he killed a man se defendendo, whereunto (for safeguard of his
goods) he may plead not guilty; and if he be found guilty se defendendo, he for-
feiteth Is goods, if not guilty, he saveth them. ' Statute of Gloucester, 1278,
6 Edw. 1, c. 9; as quoted in COKE, SECOND INsTiTUTE 316 (4th ed.).
" POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra, note 1, at 481. -
" Id. Pollock and Maitland argue that during Henry Iirs reign, (1207-1272),
forfeiture of goods was not inflicted and that the practice was one established later
by needy kings. However that may be, it would appear that from the Statute of
Gloucester in 1278 on, whatever had been the practice previously forfeiture was
definitely established as an accompaniment to a pardon for homicide in self defense.
"Beale, supra, note 1 at 570.
1 Id.
Is The statute covered cases where one killed in protecting himself from rob-
bery or murder, "in or nigh any common highway, or in their man-
sions.so Coopers Case, Cro. Car. 544 as quoted by Beale, supra, note 1, at 571.
Beale, supra, note 1 at 571.
21 STEPHEN, 3 HISTORY OF THE CrIMUNAL LAw OF ENGLAND 77. Here Stephen
speaks of the statute of 9 GEO. 4, c. 31, which provides that neither pumshment nor
forfeiture shall be exacted where one kills another in self defense.
